

CHAPTER 4

LANGUAGE AND SILENCE

4.1. Oral Utterances as Nonverbal Behaviour

Both in traditional Indian grammars and in modern studies of nonverbal behaviour, certain types of oral utterances are considered to be nonverbal behaviour. These oral utterances may be linguistic utterances in the sense that, like other utterances in a language, these utterances could also be divided into words, phonemes, etc., and these utterances are, thus, linguistically structured. Other oral utterances, which cannot be analyzed into recurring linguistic units and patterns and which are generally treated as matters outside the purview of linguistic utterances, are another category which falls within nonverbal utterances. While, thus, nonverbal behaviour is considered, both in modern times and in traditional ancient grammars as anything other than speech (in traditional grammar anything of communicative act that manifests itself in bodily actions other than speech), there has always been a recognition that certain oral utterances are also to be treated as nonverbal behaviour. In *Tolkāppiyam*, a Tamil grammatical treatise of pre-Christian era, there appears to be a distinction made between oral utterances that are the conveyors of information based on internal deliberations and oral utterances that convey internal emotions. An utterance

that reveals the internal emotions, utterances that are 'emotional outbursts of inner commotion and feelings' is considered an utterance of **meyppāṭu** (communication via bodily manifestations). This category could include utterances which in modern linguistics are generally considered paralinguistic as well as regular linguistic utterances, which are analyzable into and made of phonemes, words, sentences, etc., the building blocks, structures and patterns of regular linguistic utterances. Such a position is found attestable in the Sanskrit tradition as well. Bharata considered that regular speech utterances could also be one of the **abhinayas**. This abhinaya he called as **vāchika abhinaya**. The ancients arrived at this very significant conclusion because of their analysis of *Rasa* and *Dhvani* concepts. As pointed out in the first chapter, both these concepts have ready relevance to the foundations of research on nonverbal behaviour even today. In fact the concerns of the theories of *Rasa* and *Dhvani* are very much the basic tenets of modern studies of nonverbal behaviour, although not recognized so in the discipline. Abhinavagupta, that great master who among all others must be considered the greatest intellectual architect of synthesis and innovations of Indian studies and whose studies could easily be ranked with those of Aristotle, seems to have realized that no system of poetics, like no system of Dramaturgy, can ever completely ignore the feelings, moods and sentiments, and must find an important place for *Rasa*, the manifestation of which is as much the business of poetry as of drama. He elaborated the theory of *Rasa* in such a way as to remove the deficiencies of earlier theories by supplying additional features and also fitted it well into the *dhvani*-theory. The *dhvani* school, in its analysis of the essentials of poetry, found that the contents of a good poem may be generally distinguished into two parts. The first part is that which is

expressed and which includes what is given in so many words; in the other part, content is not expressed, but must be added to the poem by the imagination of the reader or the listener. The unexpressed or the suggested part, which is distinctly linked up with the expressed and which is developed by a peculiar process of suggestion (**vyājanā**), is taken to be the 'soul' or essence of poetry. To the grammarians and learned writers, it seemed paradoxical to state that the very essence of a poem is that which is not even expressed. On the other hand, some form of symbolical speech in which wisdom demands that one should express oneself more in hints and suggestions than in actual words was always in vogue, and the poets had been more or less partial to the method of speaking in metaphor or wrapping up their ideas in transparent allegories. But the suggestive poetry is something different from the merely metaphorical. The metaphorical or the allegoric, however veiled it may be, is still in a sense expressed and must be taken as such, but the suggestive (**vyāgya**) is always unexpressed and is therefore a source of greater charm through its capacity of concealment; for this concealment, in which consists the essence of art, is in reality no concealment at all. Thus, what we notice in these discussions is, first of all, the dichotomy between behaviour communicated via linguistic utterances and non-linguistic conduct. Secondly, the linguistic behaviour is divided into those expressed explicitly through words and those expressed/suggested without words. The latter is viewed, among others, merging with the nonlinguistic conduct. The nonlinguistic conduct, at any rate, becomes one of the major carriers of this suggestive role of linguistic utterances left unexpressed manifestly. Thirdly, this suggestive power, and through it the nonlinguistic conduct, is assumed to be the soul of the entire communication episode. In other words, while

the nonlinguistic, the nonverbal expression, is basic and fundamental in the unfolding of communicative processes and intent, it also becomes the most important process for relish.

In modern researches on nonverbal behaviour also, a dichotomy between linguistic/verbal utterances and nonverbal conduct is made. Further, there is also a distinction between utterances that are linguistic proper and that are linguistically organized in terms of explicitly analyzable linguistic units, such as phonemes, words and sentences on the one hand and utterances that are mainly emotional but more importantly do not lend themselves to analysis through linguistic units. There is also another category, very much similar to the ones intended in traditional Indian grammars, which, though consisting of linguistic utterances and thus should be considered verbal, derive their communicative nature mainly by virtue of their suggestive power. This power, in its turn, is derived not from linguistic structures and units present but from what is absent in such linguistic structures and units. Of the three categories which are based on verbal utterances, the latter two are considered as falling within the nonverbal category. Note that this approach is similar to the one we find in the Dhvani school. While it may not be categorically said that all those working on the nonverbal behaviour consider nonverbal as more basic than verbal language and reflecting the original bases of communication, such an attitude is easily recognized in modern studies of nonverbal behaviour as well.

We have already pointed out (in Chapter 1) that the boundary between verbal and nonverbal behaviour is always blurred. Above we have indicated that certain aspects of speech also are considered falling within the domains of nonverbal behaviour.

The reasons for this inclusion of aspects of speech as well within the domains of nonverbal behaviour are as follows: (i) These aspects, which are variously called paralinguistic or nonlinguistic or vocal phenomena, are subtle aspects of speech, not explicit, but fully comprehended by many. (ii) These aspects are not easily amenable for description. In other words, the elements which constitute these aspects are not easily identifiable. They seem to be unified as entities, not amenable for structural decomposition. (iii) What is communicated by these utterances is not due to the words and sentences that constitute the utterances, but because of their absence. Concealment communicates. The suggestive power of the utterances lies in what they have concealed. Since communication, in real sense, is not carried on, in these circumstances, via linguistic structures/utterances manifestly, one tends to take such communications as falling within nonverbal communication processes. (iv) These oral utterances work as cohesive single units independent of language as well, in addition to their being able to cut across languages and cultures in several instances, even though these utterances are made orally. (v) Yet another aspect of the problem is the difficulty in separating the verbal from the nonverbal in a total communicative context. Both are engaged and, in fact, both are needed to have a natural semblance of communication. (vi) Another criterion is that those which involve emotions and feelings and those utterances which are made instantaneously are considered nonverbal. This is stated on the basis of the assumption that there are more deliberations in the verbal conduct than in the nonverbal act. (vii) There is also the difficulty in comprehension and translation of nonverbal into verbal utterances. These characteristics have forced the investigators to consider some types of manifestly oral utterances also as nonverbal. In addition, since nonverbal behaviour is considered as distinct

from speech, it includes silence also. Fundamental frequency range, intensity range, speech errors, pauses, speech rate and speech duration also are considered features of nonverbal behaviour. These features are of a nature that somewhat eludes explicit description when used in communicative contexts. In other words, these features are employed for implied meanings and are not explicitly describable and stated as linguistic units. Also included in discussion of nonverbal behaviour are other communication phenomena, such as sarcasm where inconsistent combination of verbal and nonverbal behaviour takes on special significance in subtly conveying meanings.

4.2. Nonverbal Communication Via Linguistic Structure : Implied Meanings

The contents which we consider here as conveying nonverbal communicative information, namely, implied meanings, are also dealt with in linguistics and philosophy under the terms presuppositions, implications, implicature, etc. In philosophy and linguistics, every linguistic utterance may be conceived as an utterance of presupposition/implicature. In the study of nonverbal communication via language, however, only those linguistic utterances which leave out linguistic items (at the segmental level) explicitly and yet are understood in the sense conveyed by those items left out are considered having presupposition, implication, etc. Also items that have a direct bearing on emotional states, preferences, status and other factors of conduct in the external world receive a pointed attention. For example, the sentence *Please open the door*, when uttered, may be analysed in terms of certain presuppositions, in linguistics. These presuppositions are (Fillmore, 1969): The target addressed is in a position to know what door has been mentioned, and also only if that door is

not open at the time of the utterance. Specifically, there are presuppositions having to do with the fact that the target addressed must understand English, be believed by the speaker to be awake, not be totally paralyzed, etc., which have to do with questions of good faith in speech communication. There are also presuppositions about the existence and specificity of the door and these relate to the use of the definite article. There are presuppositions about the closed state of the door which must be treated as properties of the verb *open*.

Note that none of the above generally qualifies to be considered as an implication of nonverbal import in the study of nonverbal communication. The implied meanings taken into account as falling within the study of nonverbal communication are of a different sort. Consider another example: the word *bachelor*, when used as a predicate means only the property of having never been married and uses of this word presuppose that the entities being described are human, male and adult. This sort of presupposition, unless they are brought to the foreground for a deliberate purpose of communication, is not viewed as one of implication falling within nonverbal communicative act.

Thus, there are differences in the coverage of implied meanings in the fields of study of nonverbal communication on the one hand and philosophy and linguistics on the other. While all these three fields touch upon implied meanings, their scope of coverage and the aim of study of implied meanings are different. In linguistics, the coverage of implied meanings as part of linguistic description, and as an integral part of bases of languages as well as of performance of language, in recent times, is a consequence of developments in linguistic theory. Study of selectional restrictions,

in linguistics, led to a focus on the study of pre-suppositions exploited in the structural organization of language. Selectional restrictions determine which verbs can go with which nouns in a sentence. In normal language use, the nouns and verbs in a sentence must match in terms of their features. The rules that relate to the features of words are called selectional restrictions. For example, the verb *laugh* requires a human subject to produce a grammatically acceptable sentence. In a sentence, such as *The dog laughed*, there is a matching of a non-human but animate subject with a verb distinctly marked human. This matching results in a deviant sentence, which will be acceptable only if one assumes that the animal subject has or is ascribed human qualities. Originally the selectional violation of this sort was considered a syntactical error by various transformational-generative grammarians. Since this conception was seen as not fully accounting for known facts of language structure and use, several grammarians (Fillmore, 1965, 1968 and 1969) began discussing the errors of this sort as those caused by failures in presuppositions. Problems with sentences, such as *My toothbrush admires sincerity* were considered not as syntactical ones but as those which involve presupposition failure. From this the studies started covering also other aspects of implied meanings and how implied meanings are carried on and expressed by linguistic structures. Linguistic investigations revealed that presuppositions of utterances can be linked with linguistic structures and many linguistic structures are governed/used for expressing implied meanings and that there are, indeed, various types of implied meanings.

Keenan (1971) identifies items of grammatical structure (in English) that lend themselves for the expression of implied meanings. These are as follows:

- 1) **Factive Predicates:** *That Fred left surprised (didn't surprise) Mary.* The presupposition of this sentence is Fred left.
- 2) **"Definite" Names:** *John called (didn't call).* The presupposition is that John exists.
- 3) **"Cleft" Sentences:** *It was (wasn't) John who caught the thief.* The presupposition is that someone caught the thief.
- 4) **Selectional Restrictions:** *That arithmetic is incomplete surprised (didn't surprise) Magrid.* The presupposition here is that Magrid is animate and intelligent.
- 5) **Temporal Subordinate Clauses:** *John left (didn't leave) when/before/after Mary called.* The presupposition is that Mary called.
- 6) **Nonrestrictive Relatives:** *The Tiv, who respected Bohannon, are (are not) a generous people.* That the Tiv respected Bohannon is the presupposition here.
- 7) **Certain Aspectuals:** *Fred quit (didn't quit) speaking.* Fred was speaking is the presupposition.
- 8) **Iteratives:** *Fred ate (didn't eat) another turnip.* The presupposition here is that Fred ate at least one turnip.
- 9) **Presuppositional Quantifiers:** *(Not) only Fred shot himself.* The presupposition is that Fred shot himself.

Note that the analyses given above, in fact, most linguistic analyses of presuppositions, focus upon sentences and their parts. Note that in no case does the cited presupposition for sentences listed exhaust all the possible presuppositions. In other words, the presuppositions for a sentence can be numerous and can be visualized as a bottomless pit. Moreover, even if we are able to demarcate

clearly as to which of the implied meanings from the possible implied meanings identified/identifiable in logic and linguistics for a linguistic utterance, are directly relevant and falling within the scope of nonverbal communication, the demarcation would be a fuzzy one only, because of numerous overlappings and uncertainties. The state is caused by the nature of implication itself. However studies of presupposition in linguistics and logic have certainly hit upon an area of linguistic competence as well as of performance that requires insightful analysis. For instance, consider the following example (Cole, 1975): Pamela being asked (a), might reply (b).

(a) How are you doing in your new position at San Andreas Fault University?

(b) Well, I haven't been fired yet.

The question put to Pamela seeks information as to how she is getting along in her new post whereas the reply given to this question, instead of answering the question directly, reports roughly that Pamela has not yet lost her job. This reply, however, implies more than what is literally said in the answer. Pamela is suggesting, either seriously or jokingly, that being fired is a distinct possibility for her. 'When an answer, like this one is not directly relevant, the person to whom the answer is directed asks himself what conditions must obtain for the answer to be relevant. By hypothesizing what these conditions might be, he may deduce what the answer intended to communicate by means of his answer' (Cole, 1975). The deduction is based on the literal meaning of the answer and on the hypothesized state of affairs that would make the answer relevant to the question. How is this linkage between the literal meaning and implied meaning established on the one hand and how is the relation between the conversational

point raised originally by one and the answer provided (literal answer) established are questions that agitate the philosophers. In the case of linguistics, as already pointed out, the focus is on the implied meanings conveyed by a sentence and/or its parts. The focus, here, is not generally upon the implied meanings of the discourse. In the case of philosophy it is the discourse-based implied meanings that are focused upon. Conversational implicature or indirect speech acts that give the implied meanings of a conversation are focused upon in the philosophical investigations of presuppositions.

H. P. Grice (1975) makes a distinction between natural meaning and non-natural meaning of sentences/acts produced. The utterances of the non-natural meaning category do not directly give the addressee the message the speaker wishes to convey; rather the addressee must do a certain amount of inference. This is revealed in examples, such as

1) **A** asks **B** how **C** is getting on in his job and **B** replies, *Oh quite sell, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn't been to prison yet.*

2) **A:** *Smith doesn't seem to have a girl friend these days.*

B: *He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.*

The conveyance of "message" in each instance of non-natural meaning is a function of the speaker's intention, addressee recognition of the speaker's intention, and addressee response on the basis of that recognition of intention. The cases of natural meaning, on the other hand, are those in which direct telling is involved; these cases tell the addressee exactly what he is to know,

"just as surely as smoke tells us there is fire". The non-natural meaning is the conversational implicature. Basically there are two types of implicature. The conventional implicature (similar to what linguists have dealt with under presupposition, listed earlier in this section) appear to be determined by the conventional meaning of the words, besides helping to determine what is said: '*He is an English; he is, therefore, brave*'. The conversational implicatures are connected with certain general features of discourse. 'Conversational implicature is basically the notion that an utterance may mean one thing as uttered while implying (or meaning) quite another thing as understood. In cases of conversational implicature, what is meant is not what is said' (Grice, 1975).

Grice (1975) points out that our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks; they are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts. Participants observe a rule, namely: 'Make conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged'. This is called the cooperative principle. There are four categories with some specific and submaxims governed under the Cooperative principle. The four categories are Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner. The category of quantity relates to the quantity of information to be provided, with the following maxims: (i) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange). (ii) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. Under the category of Quality falls a supermaxim -- Try to make your contribution one that is true -- and, two more specific maxims: (a) Do not say what you believe to be false,

(b) Do not say a thing for which you lack adequate evidence. Under the category of Relation, there is a single maxim: Be relevant. Under the category of Manner -- the supermaxim *Be perspicuous* operates. Others are

- 1) Avoid obscurity of expression.
- 2) Avoid ambiguity.
- 3) Be brief (avoid unnecessary proclivity).
- 4) Be orderly.

Normal conversation between individuals is carried out in this fashion. Implied meanings are created in discourses by flouting the cooperative principle in conversations in several ways. To work out that a particular conversational implicature is present, the hearer will rely on the following data:

- 1) The conversational meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved;
- 2) The cooperative principle and its maxims;
- 3) The context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance;
- 4) Other items of background knowledge; and
- 5) The fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants, and both participants know or assume this to be the case.

Grice takes the above as the basis of conversational interaction between individuals and implicitly proposes that the implied meanings are caused by some "violation" or other to these basic principles underlying conversational structure. Thus, the implied meanings are found under four categories, namely,

- (a) Flouting of Quantity,
- (b) Flouting of Quality,

- (c) Flouting of Relation, and
- (d) Flouting of Manner.

(a) Flouting of Quantity:

A is writing a testimonial about a pupil who is a candidate for a philosophy job, and his letter reads as follows: Dear Sir, Mr. X's command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular.

(b) Flouting of Quality:

- 1) **Irony:** X, with whom A has been on close terms until now, has betrayed a secret of A's to a business rival. A and his audience both know this. A says "*X is a fine friend*".
- 2) **Metaphor:** You are my cream in my coffee. The speaker is attributing to his audience some feature or features in respect of which the audience resembles (more or less fancifully) the mentioned substance.
- 3) It is possible to combine metaphor and irony by imposing on the hearer two stages of interpretation. You are the cream in my coffee (You are my pride and joy), and then the irony interpretant, You are my bane.
- 4) **Meiosis:** Of a man known to have broken up all the furniture, one says He was a little intoxicated.
- 5) **Hyperbole:** Every nice girl loves a sailor.

(c) Flouting of Relation:

At a genteel tea party A says *Mrs. X is an old bag*. There is a moment of appalled silence, and then B says *The weather has been quite delightful this summer, hasn't it?* B has blatantly refused to make what HE says relevant to A's preceding remark. He thereby implicates that A's remarks should not be discussed and, perhaps more specifically, that A has committed a social gaffe.

(d) Flouting of Manner:

Ambiguity (deliberate and intended to be recognized as such).

Obscurity

Failure to be brief or succinct: Miss X produced a series of sounds that corresponded closely with the score of *Home sweet home*.

The implied meanings which are studied in linguistics, and philosophy, and in the field of non-verbal communication are dealt with differently in these fields. While in linguistics the implied meanings are studied in relation to their expression via individual sentences and parts of sentences and words, the study of implied meanings in philosophy focuses on the occurrence of implied meanings in discourse as conversational implications and also on how comprehension of implied meanings takes place. From the sentential focus in linguistics we go over to focus on discourse of implied meanings and how implied meanings are comprehended, offering an analysis of the processes and categories involved. The study of implied meanings in the field of nonverbal communication focuses more on the effects of implied meanings than on the linguistic structure or on the comprehension processes. What external factors, such as status, proxemics, etc., influence or cause the expression of implied meanings and how these implied meanings are exploited to reveal the factors/elements of nonverbal communicative behaviour become the focus of attention.

The nonverbal communication via language takes several forms -- there is manipulation of structures on the one hand and there is also the manipulation of words on the other in sentences. By these manoeuvres the speaker communicates

attitudes, likes, distances and feelings/emotions even as the constituents of sentences do not contain in themselves the same content in any literal manner. These changes, it may be noted, do occur within speech itself and may or may not have (mostly the latter) nonverbal physical manifestations. They are part of speech, but physically "found" rather in their absence in sentences. They are found in the process of manipulation, the process of implication.

Nonverbal communication via language focuses upon the communicator's particular experience of an event, his relationship to the addressee and his relationship to the message. Verbal communications seem to focus ordinarily on objective world. The individual's experiences, emotions, evaluation, preference, etc., although revealed via language units of words and sentences in an explicit manner, social constraints, emotional status of individuals, personality factors of individuals engaged in interaction, constraints of media employed, the need for secrecy and so on force individuals to resort to a type of "round about" language use with implied meanings. Individuals feel relieved and sure that they have communicated what they wanted to in an adequate manner by this process, which for them avoids embarrassing or insecure moments. There is a continuous process, some prescribed and taught by socialization processes, and some innovated by individuals but within the limits of comprehension, by which the society evolves a close conjunction between verbal and nonverbal communication.

Generally speaking, in linguistics, aspects of language use and manipulation of linguistic structures for nonverbal communication do not receive any pointed attention except in some schools or rather subschools of linguistics. However, a closer look

into the operation of linguistic structures, especially from the point of view of assumptions we have already listed (4.2), reveal clearly that nonverbal communication via language has certain specified corners in linguistic structure. Keenan's identification of these corners has been already presented above. Use of pronouns, tense, adjectivals and adverbials, and specialized words acting as symbols for a series of layers of meanings abet nonverbal communication via language. In other words, information (rather absence or distortion of information) on dramatic personae, location, time and symbols combining these three become carriers of nonverbal communication. The speaker's role vis-a-vis the above completes the cycle of nonverbal communication -- speaker's attitudes, likes, judgments, involvement, etc., become the focus in the entire episode and the distortion of information is pursued to highlight the speaker's role.

Investigation of the characteristics of language use in nonverbal communication that communicate various cues of interpersonal relationships have not been investigated in any detailed manner in linguistics (except as listed earlier). Information on this subject matter is scattered in various articles of both psychological and anthropological interests as well as in various forms of tests prepared for psychological experiments. The nonverbal communicative dimensions of these aspects were originally emphasized in recent times in the work of Wiener and Mehrabian (1968). Wiener and Mehrabian focus on the implied relationship and meanings between the speaker, the objects and events, and the message implied. They identify the relationships under various heads, namely, spatio-temporal indicators of implied meanings, denotative specificity leading on to implied meanings, selective emphasis of occurrence in an utterance which brings out the implication,

implied meanings based on agent-action-object relationships, use of modifiers to linguistic items that give implied meanings, and other processes.

Let us consider some illustrations:

1) The husband and wife living under the same roof may choose to address one another through letters, or an intermediary person, signifying the "distance" between them in their relations at that moment, to signify their anger towards one another, etc. One may choose to reply in writing to signify the distance between him and the individual he addresses, even when the person addressed is physically present face to face. The switch-over from one usual form of communication to another here signifies the changed relationship between individuals.

2) Likewise one may switch from an informal form of language use to the use of formal language; one may switch from the use of the colloquial to the written form of language signifying the change in content and/or interpersonal relationship.

3) To signify the "distance" between individuals who have had close relations until then, one may refuse to use the address terms, nicknames, pet names, and so on, to address each other.

4) To signify the "distance" between individuals, one may not use or, if one has used it till then, may stop using the first name, and address one another in formal terms.

5) To signify the close relationships between individuals, one may start using first names, pet names, etc. One may also start using terms of endearments.

6) To signify the growing "distance" between individuals, their dislikes, etc., one may use the correct form of address demanded only on formal occasions, at all the occasions.

7) The reference to individuals not present also can be so modulated as to reveal the kind of relationship,

distances, likes and dislikes, etc., the speaker has for the person referred to.

8) Spontaneity or otherwise of an acknowledgement, in words, of help rendered/received can carry implied meanings, acting as nonverbal communication.

9) Spontaneity or otherwise of an acknowledgement, in words, of some deeds, possessions, characteristics of an individual, etc., can carry implied meanings, acting as nonverbal communication.

10) To refer to a person in neuter or in masculine or feminine singular, in most Indian languages, communicates the low estimation the speaker has for the one who is addressed or referred to, especially when address and/or reference to that individual is normally in respectful terms (in plural).

11) A speaker can imply his exclusion or inclusion in a group (Mehrabian, 1972): I think we enjoyed ourselves/ I think they enjoyed themselves.

12) A speaker can imply that one particular object and not the other is involved: I think they enjoyed **the party**.

13) A speaker can imply differences in his relationship to the objects in the statement: I think I enjoyed their company.

14) A speaker can vary the tense in the utterance to imply that a particular event is relevant or not relevant now: I think they **were** enjoying themselves.

15) A speaker can choose modifiers to focus on the relationship between him and the object: They acted as if they enjoyed themselves. This ascribes ambiguity/uncertainty. I am sure they enjoyed themselves. This ascribes certainty.

16) A speaker can choose modifiers to emphasize his particular interpretation of the event: I am sure that they enjoyed the party.

A speaker can separate himself from the object

of his message, from his addressee or from the message itself. This is clearly revealed in the use of linguistic structures. This speech non-immediacy involves locative adverbs, tense and pronouns. Consider the following examples:

17) One separates himself from others who are also physically present in the same place by saying 'I do not understand **those** people'. The words **this, that, these, those, here, there, near, now, far away** and **long ago** all can be used to imply distance and separation between those engaged in an interaction.

18) Another means to imply non-immediacy is the use of tense. In response to the question "Are you a member of the Staff Society?" if the answer given is "I have been a member", this answer implies the non-immediacy between the answerer and the object. Note that in Tamil and several other Indian languages, the equational sentence pattern (with both subject and predicate as nouns and without any verb -- **itu viiṭu** "This house" meaning "This is a house") is used for "I am a member" construction and that once the remoteness in time is to be expressed, conversion from the equational to the verbal structure is demanded [**nān uruppinan** "I member" ("I am a member")] is changed to **nān uruppinanāy iruntēn** ("I have been a member"). Thus, this conversion process itself may indicate the non-immediacy between the speaker and the object. Note further that both spatial and temporal non-immediacy indicates, generally speaking, negative attitudes and preferences (Mehrabian, 1972). The choice of linguistic structures, here, is not simply a matter of style. The choice has certain functions. To that extent, language fulfils and retains the nonverbal bases of communication.

19) Denotative specificity or lack of It is another language characteristic that is exploited to imply meanings, relating to preferences, likes, etc. Consider the example given by Mehrabian (1972): Our daughter to be, our son's fiancée, his fiancée, his lady friend, his friend,

she, the person, or that thing. One notices decreasing degrees of denotative specificity in the above utterances linked with the expression of decreasing degrees of liking.

20) Consider this example: I like the wrapper of this book. Here the reference is overspecific or over-exclusive. This also shows the distance and dislike.

21) By manipulating personal pronouns to denote someone or some object, we may reveal non-immediacy. Use of **I** is more specific than **we** which is more specific than "people" which in its turn is more specific than the use of "one" in a sentence giving some generalized information. Quantum of specificity here is linked with the quantum of immediacy professed by the subject towards an object.

22) Another linguistic structure that is often exploited to indicate non-immediacy, non-involvement and lack of preference is the use of negation. The answer '**It wasn't bad**' is a good example of this phenomenon.

23) The order in which objects are presented in a conversation, etc., also indicates nonverbally the focus of importance bestowed upon persons, objects and events. The order in which persons, objects or events are presented highlights the immediacy in some sense. Note that the order of narration could be influenced by other reasons such as the emotional states of narrators. Status and importance assigned are, however, clearly implied by the order of presentation on most occasions.

24) Consider the following sets of sentences:

- (a) They are fighting.
 She was fighting with him.
 He was fighting with her.

Each one of these sentences presents the objective event of fighting, with some implied meaning focusing on the agent/agents. The choice of the word to denote the agent implies the view of the speaker.

- (b) I went to school with my mother.
 I was taken to school by my mother.

These sentences imply volition or otherwise of the act.

- (c) I should go, I have to go,
I am compelled to go.

in contrast to

- I want to go, I would like to go or
I will go.

The sentences of the former set imply compulsion.

- (d) **pēnā tolaintuvittatu**

in contrast to

pēnāvait tolaituvittēn,

in Tamil. The first sentence literally means that the pen got itself lost whereas the second sentence means that "I have lost the pen". The first sentence implies several possibilities/modes that have led to the loss of the pen, ascribing no particular agent or reason. The second sentence specifies the agent. Thus, the distinction between the weak (former) form and strong form (the latter) of verb, revolving around intransitive and transitive distinctions of verb communicates the extent of involvement and assumption of responsibility for the loss of pen.

25) Uses of modifiers to statements, such as **I think, I believe, I feel** implies that what the speaker experiences may not be experienced the same way by the listener.

26) Use of modifiers to statements, such as **It is obvious, It is evident, It is simply true** separates the speaker from the objects in his message. Modifiers generally have the function of indicating 'the speaker's less positive attitude toward the event described, or his reluctance to relay this information to that particular addressee' (Mehrabian, 1972). The modifiers also decrease immediacy.

27) Consider the following sentences:

- I just borrowed it for a moment or two.
It is only a minor change.
It is really unimportant.
It is simply unnecessary.

Through the use of words like **just, only, simply, you**

know, etc., the speaker wishes to communicate his involuntary or minimal association. The use indicates negative attitudes towards the object in the message or the reporting of the events to the addressee.

28) Phrases, such as **you know?**, **Right?**, **that is**, **well**, **uh** indicate false starts and imply ambivalence.

29) Choice of terms of endearments also implies the likes and dislikes on the one hand and the immediacy or non-immediacy between the speaker and the addressee. There is a strange contradictory posture in the use of endearment terms derived from sexual organs and sexual relations. At times the use of such endearment terms is considered revealing the positive relationship between the speaker and the addressee. At other times, when the situation is tense with anger and growing misunderstanding, the use of same terms comes to imply the dislike and growing non-immediacy.

30) The same situation is found in the use of kinship terms as terms of address and reference.

31) Another process which implies immediacy as well as non-immediacy is the process of 'naming'. To imply the liking and the close relationship between individuals one may resort to calling the other in first person, pet name, nickname, etc. The process may be exploited also for implying the growing distance between the speaker and the addressee under conditions wherein the closeness of relations has been implied by means other than the use of first name.

There are several other linguistic mechanisms that lend themselves for implicit, nonverbal communication via language. These linguistic structures are generally covered in grammars as formal units (based on the order of occurrence and distribution of forms), but not usually looked at from the point of view of implicit nonverbal communication. We give below a few additional processes noticed in an Indian language, Tamil. Each of the

following is a structural process and as such the units are describable formally. But their function is found not in their formal composition/constitution but what they imply when they are used.

1) Use of neuter affixes in finite verb constructions in the place of affixes that indicate a human is the subject of the main verb in the sentence. In **Rāman pōkīrān** 'Raman - he goes, (Raman goes)' **ān** at the end indicates that the subject of the sentence is a human. The same sentence can be made to end in neuter suffix to imply, among other things, a negative attitude to the subject: **Rāman pōkīratu** 'Raman - it goes (Raman goes)'.

2) One may address an individual either in a main verb ending sentence type or in a modal verb ending sentence type, for giving directives, etc. Addressing an individual in main verb ending sentences (**nī itai appaṭi cey** 'you this that like do', You do that like this) immediately places the addressee in honorific -- non-honorific scale. Addressing an individual in a modal verb ending sentence type (**itai appaṭi ceyyalām** 'this that may do' (You) may do this like that) even with a non-honorific second person pronoun in the subject position makes one feel that the speaker wants to be either respectful to some extent or wants to be non-committal. Modal verb ending sentences in Tamil and many Indian languages carry in them an implication of non-involvement/non-committal on the part of the speaker and provide options to the addressee.

3) There are many linguistic factors found in language performance which also give out several implied meanings. For example, knowledge of other languages, in particular knowledge of English as revealed through an interspersing of loan words, phrases, idioms and sentences in the speech of the speaker imply his status and could elicit either negative or positive effects in the addressee. However, note an interesting facet. A qualitative distinction between the affects caused by the use of a borrowed word with the same pronunciation of the word as found in the donor

language as opposed to use of the borrowed word with the "corrupt" pronunciation as found in the recipient language is made. Utterance of a borrowed word with its original pronunciation as found in the donor language implies a higher social and educational status for the speaker whereas the "corrupt" pronunciation of the borrowed word ceases to evoke any particular respect from other individuals in the interaction. Use of phrases is, however, generally done only by the educated and as such use of a phrase borrowed from another language, in particular English, implies that the speaker is educated, when he uses it. Code-switching in the sense of switching over from an Indian language to English also implies a higher social and educational status.

4) We have referred to the process of neuterization which is used to imply negative effect [See (1) above]. The same neuterization process can be used also to imply a superior status of the person addressed. The shopkeeper tends to address and/or refer to the woman customer in third person singular neuter as a mark of respect. This device is resorted to by the servants. The masters also resort to this process when referring to servants to whom, for various reasons, such as age, blood relationship, etc., such deference is due. As opposed to this there is another behaviour in which elevation as a process of downgrading is resorted to. In the latter contexts, the speaker, by the norm, is expected only to use the second person singular pronoun form to address the addressee or use the third person human singular pronoun form to indicate the person referred to, since only such address and reference are appropriate to the addressee or person referred to. But, in order to imply displeasure and/or disrespect, the speaker would use the second person plural pronoun form which is normally used to show respect and the corresponding plural ending (respectful form) in the verb to indicate the person referred to. Another process is the process of downgrading when the addressee is absent. Face to face, an individual is addressed with second person plural pronoun form and with plural ending

in the verb, and other deferential gestures, etc., but when the addressee is absent, the reference is made to him with third person human singular pronoun form with singular ending in verb, to imply disrespect. At times, respect to others is to be implied by not addressing them directly using second person pronouns. Even in face to face interaction they are to be "addressed" not in second person, but in third person. Use of pronoun forms for face to face address implies showing disrespect, thus, in certain contexts. The use of other types of address forms than pronouns is to be generally avoided. This is very clearly demonstrated in master-servant relationship of old order still prevalent in villages and in the relationship between Gurus and disciples in several Hindu sects and abbeys.

Implication via language can, indeed, take on many forms -- every linguistic item can lend itself to this process, once the conversation ambit is well established between two individuals engaged in interaction. This ambit is dependent on limits of comprehension imposed on individuals by the linguistic structures and social contexts. However, the individuals can construct their own ambit which mostly falls within the socially accepted comprehension procedures but at times takes on idiosyncratic propositions. The implications are found placed in linguistic structures of individual sentences, parts of sentences and individual words. Implications are also found across sentences within the utterances of a speaker and/or in utterances jointly engaged in by the speaker and the addressee. These implications carry nonverbally, or act as means for the expression of positive or negative affects, proxemic variables involving both individual and social factors, and could also be used to reveal the status and interpersonal relations of individuals engaged in interaction. The study of nonverbal communication focuses itself on the role of the implications not in terms of the linguistic or

conversational structures but on the effects to which the implications are used.

4.3. Oral Nonverbal Communication

Inconsistent communication is one form of oral communication that has nonverbal denotations. There are two types of inconsistency -- one inconsistency is found in the linguistic utterance itself and another inconsistency is between linguistic utterances and nonverbal behaviour. The first type of inconsistency comes from the fact that while the utterance has the structure of a positive statement, its import is taken to be negative. This is achieved in several ways. With certain emphasis markers uttered in a tone of disbelief, the intended effect is brought out. For example, consider this Tamil sentence:

avan **tānē**, varuvān!

Oh! he? He will certainly come.

The utterance with the emphasis marker (boldface) uttered in a tone of disbelief gives the meaning that he will not come. Also, by repetition of the word or phrase which stands for the content focused, in a tone of disbelief, the intended effect may be brought out. Thirdly, by relevant and slow or non-utterance of the word focusing on the content, the intended effect may be brought out. By an abrupt stoppage of an utterance omitting the word or phrase that should have been uttered, one could bring out the intended effect. There may be an intelligent, confidence sharing and seeking look, treating the other as a confederate, which also can bring out the intended effect. Note that the effect of inconsistency in all these efforts is one of negation of what is literally meant in the utterance.

The inconsistency between linguistic behaviour and nonverbal behaviour also communicates attitudes

and positions one takes, and the feelings of the communicator. Among other things, this inconsistency between linguistic behaviour and nonverbal behaviour is used for assertion of one's own position. Inconsistency between linguistic utterance and nonverbal behaviour is a special characteristic of one who is in love. This feature has been greatly exploited in literature. While in the moral and religious planes the inconsistency between linguistic utterance and nonverbal behaviour in the sense of conduct in the world is frowned upon, the consistency in one form or another is anticipated, sought for and carefully cultivated and analyzed in areas such as diplomacy and political and economic transactions and bargains. In all these spheres, all the spheres including assertion of one's position and love, there is always a link between the linguistic utterance and the nonverbal behaviour with which it is at variance.

Just as the inconsistency between literal meaning of an utterance and overall intended meaning, caused by the coupling of literal meaning with a tone of disbelief, etc., there could be inconsistency between a linguistic utterance and the facial expression with which the utterance is made. On occasions, it is the facial expression that either supports or negatives what is stated orally. When there is inconsistency between the oral statement and the facial expression, and the facial expression is considered negating the statement made, the facial expression decides the import of the content of the message orally communicated. On the other hand, if the facial expression is kept, in some sense, neutral in relation to the content of the oral statement, the oral statement decides the import of the message conveyed. While the facial expression remains neutral or even appropriate to the literal meaning of the oral statement, the oral statement itself may

have certain modulations in its delivery speed, loudness, intonation, and accent. Or it may be made in a repetitive manner. These modulations, and not the facial expression, either support or negative the underlying statement. Also one may put on facial expressions diametrically opposite to what one says orally and may expect the addressee to understand the statement in its literal sense (which is sought to be negated by the facial expression). For this exchange to be successful there should be some prior understanding between the speaker and the addressee and also compelling contexts. Thus, note that normally the facial expression is the one that contributes a lot for correct interpretation of the communicative intent of the message. At the same time, the modulations made in the oral utterance also have an important role in the correct comprehension of the message, at times over-riding the contributions made by facial expressions. Finally, on certain occasions, the facial expressions are employed as a cover to communicate orally messages diametrically opposite to the ones communicated by facial expressions. In other words, it appears to us that, in the study of inter-relationship between facial expressions and oral communication, the dynamic processes of the situation, facial expressions and oral modulations need to be focused upon, and not merely the facial expressions or oral-statements.

Inconsistency between facial expressions and oral statements involves ambiguity and inaccuracy and, as such, in spite of overall comprehension of the communicative intent on most occasions, there will be occasions in which correct interpretation becomes difficult. This difficulty may be caused by the inadequate sharing of each other's sociocultural background; it would be caused by differences in individual speech styles as well as by educational levels. Also suddenness in the

occurrence of such divergences in expression may cause the difficulty. Excessive reliance on idiomatic expressions and on certain models is another factor in this regard.

Why does one resort to the mechanism of inconsistent messages? Is it merely for the effects? On many occasions we find that the choice is spontaneous and natural, influenced by the prevalent emotional states of the individual. Such spontaneous use of inconsistent messages as we find in sarcasm is caused by the prevalent emotional state of the individual. Saying this, however, does not explain why in the first place one should resort to the mechanism of inconsistency when one's language provides a mechanism to state straight what one wants to communicate. Inconsistency in messages is resorted to for positive as well as negative affects. (One verbally insults another while smiling. A girl says *I don't like you much* to her boy friend with a smile and loving vocalization; one could produce an irritated facial expression accompanied by positive verbal and vocal expression.) The mechanism of inconsistent messages is infrequently used, although it is used for conveying a variety of information. The use of the mechanism of inconsistent messages is also made only by individuals placed in certain types of situations. There is also a social compulsion that for certain situations one should use only the mechanism of inconsistent messages. Socialization processes in every society inculcate in individuals the knowledge of such situations that demand taking recourse to the mechanism of inconsistent messages. Apart from such socially situational factors, there are also occasions in which an individual resorts to the mechanism of inconsistent messages purely in self-defence, for self-preservation in situations that he considers inimical to his well being. In other words, although the mechanism of inconsistent

messages is part of language use, it also appears to have its independent existence outside language; it uses language structure, but is linked with non-linguistic media. It is a language use, but depends also on, or rather has roots also in, nonlinguistic media. It appears to be a part of the general communication system and not an exclusively used linguistic mechanism.

Of the several characteristics that distinguish human communication from animal communication systems, the facility to prevaricate is an important one. The mechanism of inconsistent messages must be seen as an outgrowth of this facility to prevaricate. This facility takes on several forms and the inconsistency between message and facial expression is one such form. The various forms of prevarication have all been made an integral part of social behaviour with social meanings. Prevarication retains its species preservation function at the individual level and takes on the regulatory function at the social level. Exploiting this facility at the social level in the form it is currently prevalent as a mismatch between facial expression and oral expression, the individual subjects himself to the social conduct while, at the same time, preserving his emotional states. Additionally, he finds that the mechanism furthers his interest in the form of greater effects in the communication process.

4.4. Concealment Via Language

Use of implied meanings and inconsistent messages is one form of concealment via language, but in actuality, it is intended to reveal. There could be attempts at total concealment and these attempts may have certain linguistic and/or other behavioural consequences. All societies distinguish between these two forms of concealment via

language and have been teaching their members how to go about recognizing the various forms of concealment. In the earlier sections we presented a few behavioural manifestations in both linguistic structures and nonverbal processes as regards the recognition of concealment in the former category. We shall presently see and recognize behaviour that aims at 'revealing' the attempts at total concealment via language. Note that efforts at total concealment also derive their facility from the characteristic of prevarication inherent in human communication process.

The lower speed with which one speaks, in suspicious circumstances, is considered revealing that the speaker is lying. One refuses to talk, or talks less with more speech errors under such circumstances. At the same time, if one also speaks, in some sense, in an abnormally speedier rate, goes on repeating rapidly what he has stated, under circumstances of suspicion, the speaker is considered to be lying. That is, lower speed at one end and an abnormally higher speech rate on the other end, within circumstances of suspicion, coupled with faltering at one end and rapid repetition at another, characterized in both the ends with speech errors, mark that the individual is concealing something.

Speech styles are specifically cultivated which first of all aim at the creation of speaker credibility in the listeners. Once the credibility is established (in the establishment of credibility also language use plays a crucial part), a speaker can manipulate the delivery of speech in several ways: He could tell the truth convincing the hearer that the hearer is hearing the truth. He can tell the truth convincing the hearer that the hearer is hearing a lie. He can tell a lie convincing the hearer that he is hearing a truth. He can tell a lie convincing

a hearer that he is hearing a lie. The deliberations in this area have been a much talked about topic all through the ages. One tries to conceal something with a convincing reason, as most humans aim at, and one also does it without a convincing reason if they are believed to be divine or super-human in some sense. In the latter, even though concealment is not really achieved, it is accepted that concealment has taken place, because the divine person wants that the matter be treated as concealed. Rhetoric and psychology of persuasion discuss various factors that go into the alchemy of truth and lie. Within the study of nonverbal communication processes we find that nodding, gesturing, leg and foot movements, immediacy, speed and frequency of talk, quantum of talk, quantum of errors and facial expressions such as smile are differentially exploited for the purposes of concealment via language. The truth value of a statement made via linguistic utterances, under circumstances of suspicion, is found related to the above variables. A deceitful speaker, generally speaking, nods and gestures less, avoids eye contact, exhibits less frequent leg and foot movements, does not get closer to the other, keep himself at a distance from the addressee, talks less and slower, with more speech errors. He also smiles more and inappropriately. There is something in his total face which reveals his complicity, his attempt at concealment while he makes a linguistic statement to the contrary. And yet a major problem is to decide with any certainty as to whether these features are directly related to his present misdemeanour or are derived from his remote past. Some do have personality problems and personal appearances which lead to the above listed features even in their normal communication. Through caste and other social institutions we cultivate certain stereotype notions against some social groups and these notions also

come to "guide" us in our recognition and interpretation of the concealment behaviour of individuals belonging to various social groups. On the other hand, the individuals who are suspected of concealing information begin to see themselves in the same way the others see them or expect to see them. Concealment via language, thus, is to be seen as a very complex phenomenon. Even the simple markers of concealment which we have listed as accompanying a linguistic statement and as revealing the deceitful nature of the communication made require careful and restrictive handling.

4.5. Nonverbal Communication Via Paralanguage

Paralinguistic characteristics are of two types. Features, such as junctures, stress and pitch are an integral part of a linguistic utterance and are sequentially linked with the linguistic utterance. That is, they occur with linguistic units, such as words and phrases; junctures distinguish clauses; stress and pitch occur within a clause, on words and phrases. Stress is the increase and/or decrease in loudness, and pitch is the rise and fall of fundamental frequency within a clause. These are all identifiable segments and spread over specific segments, such as words in a linguistic utterance. They are not dependent on any particular content; they are content-free. Another set of paralinguistic features are generally not segmentable and they stand on their own to signify individual contents. They are content-signifying paralinguistic features, include the organismic characteristics of the speaker, such as age, sex, state of health, fatigue, status in a group and/or in a social organization. Paralinguistic features also include laughing, giggling, snickering, whimpering, sobbing and crying, yelling, muttering, muffled sounds, and paralinguistic features are viewed by the speakers of a language

as revealing personality traits, personal qualities and emotional states. Of these, personality traits and personal qualities are ascribed by prevalent social values and the emotional states are dependent both on individual psychological states and social prescriptions. Both content-free and content-signifying paralinguistic features are exploited to reveal attitudes also. There is yet another category of features which accompany speech performance. These are disturbances in speech as well as supportive vocalizations of speech performance. These include sentence correction noises, sentence incompleteness noises, stuttering noises, interspersing of incoherent sounds, slips of the tongue, neologisms, transposition of words, substitution of words, omission of words, addition of syllables, inadequate pauses, repetition, too many and not so appropriate interjections, abrupt insertion of and/or switch over to other codes and so on. These paralinguistic features are taken from both content-free and content-signifying elements on the one hand and from language units proper, on the other hand. Uses of these generally signify the conflict in the speaker. While use of paralinguistic features is essential for a normal use of language (their absence will take the communication either excessively formal or abnormal) their excessive use indicates the collapse or impending collapse of language use in the speaker. The content-free paralinguistic features find some place in the orthographic systems of languages, whereas, of the content-signifying paralinguistic features, only a few are accommodated by way of punctuation marks in the written forms of communication. Some of the content-signifying paralinguistic features are of a universal type, whereas several others are culture-bound. The content-free and content-signifying paralinguistic features may be viewed as bases of human language communication.

4.6. Silence as Nonverbal Communication

Silence is viewed differently by different scholars and different schools of thought. For example, the emergence of human language from the animal communication systems is viewed as breaking silence; this breaking silence, in this view, becomes a characteristic of humans, (Steiner, 1969): 'Possessed of speech, possessed by it, the word having chosen the grossness and infirmity of man's condition for its own compelling life, the human person has broken free from the great silence of matter'. Since all the values have been exhausted and since there is nothing new to be said or worth saying, silence is created/adopted (Steiner, 1969). Another view is to look at silence as a negative correlate of speech: if there is silence, there is no speech and if there is speech, there is no silence. Silence, in this view, is considered antithetical to speech; speech signifies expression and silence signifies lack or negation of information. In another view silence becomes an integral part of speech, since without interspersing it in speech, the speech becomes meaningless, incoherent, monotonous and unanalyzable. Silence then becomes a tool in the hands of speech, it is a handmaid of speech, without whose help speech itself cannot progress. In some other view, silence is information, and speech only a reflection of it. Speech is devalued since it is resorted to scandalously frequent and thus loses its information, whereas silence becomes the information; untouched and unprobed yet, silence becomes the refuge, for all information. In the beginning was word and man returns to word through silence, either by death or by tapas/meditation. In this view, then, one attains speech via silence. Silence is the basis of speech; silence is broken to create speech and silence is created to close speech -- an eternal cyclic process, symbolized and exploited

in most theological and mythical approaches to language. These assumptions have a sound basis in the patterns of human communication as well. Apart from this mutual dependence between silence and speech there are also communicative functions assigned to silence in nonverbal communication. These functions are operational both in the inter-personal transactions between individuals as individuals and in the interaction between individuals as members of social groups.

Silence includes hesitations and pauses as well as failure to produce speech. Silence may operate independently or it may operate in conjunction with other nonverbal means, such as eye and face. It may closely precede or follow an utterance by the speaker, created and maintained for the effect of the utterance by the speaker. Or silence could also be created several other ways in the hearers, and the silence thus created may communicate nonverbally many things.

The role of silence in communication could be viewed from the point of view of its functions relating to performance of speech, as well as from the functions of silence independent of speech. Speech is one of silence followed by utterance followed by silence. Within an utterance also, silence between breath groups, juncture and pause between sentences, apart from fulfilling the functions of units in a linguistic utterance, can be so modulated as to imply more. In any case, speech becomes comprehensible only if an adequate amount and frequency of silence is interspersed in the utterances made. Note that, just as several other features (prevarication and discreteness, etc.), silence is also brought into linguistic utterances to play crucial roles in the production, maintenance and comprehension of linguistic structures.

Hesitation phenomenon, which is considered

by us as part of silence, consists of a variety of pauses and serves several functions. Hesitation normally indicates the individual's state of mind and emotion as regards the content of message he is about to speak. The indecision as regards the manner in which the message is to be delivered also is revealed in the hesitation phenomena. Sometimes, for certain messages, hesitation phenomenon is chosen deliberately, as hesitation, then from the point of view of the speaker, is seen as the most appropriate form to convey the message. Reluctance, fear, speaker's own disbelief of the message he is to speak out, fear of consequences all influence hesitation. Hesitation is also socially warranted as a mode of showing respect to the content of the message and/or addressee.

Along with hesitation, a speaker may also utter interjections and make other noises which do not have the structure of linguistic utterances, although they have a phonetic manifestation. These utterances, such as *im*, *hum*, *ah*, *er*, *mm* and their repetitions signify the ongoing hesitation, silence. They also communicate the anxiety level of the speaker. Excessive resort to such utterances reduces the comprehensibility of linguistic utterances. Their occurrence and repetition reveal some speech disturbance. At the same time these pausal utterances are exploited by the speakers also to encode what they want to communicate in appropriate grammatical structures and words. Hesitations of these sorts enable the speaker to process his mental thought into proper words and grammatical structure, while impeding comprehension at the hearer's level.

In an interaction, conversation is carried on with comprehension, only if the individuals engaged in conversations take turns appropriately. In other words, if one is speaking, the other should remain

silent at least partly. This situation is not that simple a context as it appears to be. The conversation is carried on with speaking and silence, based on decisions as to who will speak and who will remain silent. This decision signifies status of individuals and importance of content, among other things. There are well laid criteria in many contexts within a language community as regards who would initiate the conversation by breaking the silence, who would maintain it, who would speak more and who would end the conversation. In some contexts, the person with inferior status breaks the silence and, in some others, the person with superior status does the same. A person in greater need always takes the initiative to break the silence. On occasions it becomes a sign of deference to remain or become silent because of the emotional situation in which the individuals are placed. Deep emotions are expressed by silence. Embarrassment is also expressed by silence. Silence becomes an effective mode to maintain secrets; silence, then, is considered secretive. Silence is used also to maintain distance between individuals. All these factors are nonverbal factors and these communicate the social status, and emotional status of individuals. Also note that apart from the silences that are demanded so as to carry out the conversation in a comprehensible manner, there are other types of silences, short, lengthy, frequent, abrupt and/or slowly progressing silences. A lengthy silence on the part of one engaged in conversation with another may signify that one is cautious and/or careful; a close emotional relationship between the two could also be signified. It could also mean snubbing the other. Between those who are in love, silence comes as a prelude to something more intimate, physical and/or mental. Glances with affection and changes in facial expressions precede or follow

this silence, whereas stare precedes or follows the silence when two are about to quarrel. Silence can also be used to hedge and to avoid confrontation. Noninvolvement and noncommittal position is yet another meaning communicated by silence. Anger is also communicated nonverbally by silence.

Silence can be used as a form of social control also. A person who has violated a social norm is treated or welcomed with silence. While "talking back", "report" and "rebuttal" are considered showing disrespect and/or disobedience in many Indian communities, even reply in certain contexts which involve matters on interpersonal relations between members of different sexes, interpersonal relationships between family members and on matters generally expected to be handled by the male spouse, even when a reply is by the speaker superior to the addressee, is considered as showing disrespect. While some of the latter contexts may be due to the separation of functions between members of a family, the addressee simply does not reply, even in areas generally approved as the rightful domain of the addressee, as silence is treated as concurrence/agreement and which, when broken through utterances, is treated as disrespect to the other. Thus, at one level, silence, when addressed, is considered as showing respect and response, and, at another level, is considered as showing disrespect. Silence is viewed a virtue in many Indian communities. Ultimate realization of God and supreme knowledge is by *dhyān* of which silence is an important vehicle, in religious practices. Thus, in more ways than one, silence receives importance as a means of communication.